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FICTION AS EPISTEMOLOGY IN LITTLE DORRIT
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ABSTRACT
Although at least as much has been written about the aesthetic 
features of Dickensfs novels as about the moral vision they embrace, 
the relation between art and ethos in the Dickensian imagination has 
received comparatively little critical attention. Yet the work at the 
very heart of the Dickens canon, Little Dorrit, demands to be read in 
terms of its broad structural and thematic concern not only with the 
idea of fiction as an equally moral and aesthetic system but, more 
precisely, with the idea of fiction as a form of mediation between 
a public, literal world and a private and imaginative one.
Such an idea governs the novel on at least two levels, each worthy 
of the comprehensive examination the present thesis attempts to afford.
In the first place, characters in Little Dorrit so consistently orient 
themselves to social, psychological, and.even spiritual realities by 
translating them into equivalent fictions that virtually everyone in 
the novel emerges as a kind of amateur novelist. By testing what 
amounts to an epistemology of imagination —  in which what is known 
is known largely through acts of fancy —  Dickens reflects the 
nineteenth-century impulse to respond to life in the fictional mode, 
an impulse that can be seen as clearly in the novelistic prose of 
Carlyle, Ruskin, and Newman as in the Victorian novel itself.
In the second place, if, as Ian Watt suggests, the novel in 
general may be roughly defined as a uniquely and essentially realistic 
literary genre, the question of how any prose narrative orients itself 
to reality by converting a social universe into a fictional one v
deserves consideration. Its concern with the efficacy of fictionalization 
as a technique of adaptation to experience makes Little Dorrit an ideal 
object of inquiry. A study of what might be called the will to 
fictionalization in the novel, the thesis addresses the larger question 
of how any novel responds to the world outside itself, and explores 
another subject central to Little Dorrit —  the role and responsibility 
of the artist.
In Little Dorrit Dickens regards art (and especially rhetorical 
art) as a potential bridge between various spheres of human activity 
and experience and so ultimately as a category of moral expression. The 
novel reflects a fascination with the nature of fiction at once 
peculiar to Dickens, and, in a broader sense, common to both the age 
and genre in which he wrote. But it also shows Dickens developing a 
more concrete and complex definition of fiction that critics of the novel 
have in the past been willing to admit. Thus while the present thesis 
focuses on the dynamics of the central themes of fiction and imaginative 
translation, its wider emphasis is upon the Dickensian conception of 
the nature and purpose of art.
iv
To advance the claim that Little Dorrit is a novel about novels, 
br simply that it is a novel about itself, would be to perform at best 
an exercise in critical extremism and at worst an act of academic 
vanity. But post-modernism aside, one of the central observations 
to be made about the work at the heart of the Dickens canon is that 
in Little Dorrit imagination mediates all experience and fictionalization 
emerges as an essential mode of orientation to reality. "Narrative,” 
writes Barbara Hardy, "cannot be regarded simply as an aesthetic 
invention used by the artist in order to control, manipulate, order, 
and investigate the experiences of that life we tend to separate from 
art, but must be seen as a primary act of mind transferred to art 
from life."* Just so, Dickens's conception not merely of narrative 
but of fiction in general may be understood at all only when it is 
understood as a "primary act of mind" so bound up with perception as 
to be inseparable from it.
"To begin my life at the beginning of my life, I record that I 
was bom,” announces David Copperfield, anticipating the fusion of 
imaginative and existential activity increasingly conspicuous in Dickens. 
Quite as, for David, being bom and writing about being bom conflate, 
the living of life and its rewriting in imagination become in
2
Little Dorrit indistinguishable. In the later novel, however, Dickens 
allows an omniscient narrative eye to examine the dynamics and im­
plications of such rewritings: individually and collectively characters
invariably attempt to convert experience into some version of itself 
that will be tolerable psychologically and acceptable socially.
In the first-person narratives preceding Little Dorrit —  as in 
any first-person narrative —  life and fiction must be coterminous; 
memory is simultaneously factitious and inventive; history is story.
Thus without calling into question either her veracity as the author
of her experience or her right to be so, Esther Summers on can write
near the end of Bleak House: f,I have suppressed none of my many
weaknesses on that subject £the subject of Allen Woodcourt], but 
have written them as faithfully as my memory has recorded them.1 ~
Little Dorrit, on the other hand, concentrates on the techniques 
whereby its villains and its heroes alike internalize reality only by 
translating it into fiction. Hence when near the end of the novel 
Dickens introduces the 1 History of a Self-Tormentor" he also introduces 
a question quite literally of authority. Miss Wade*s masterpiece of 
translation dramatizes the imaginative machinations which have con­
stituted most psychic activity in the novel, and calls attention to
their subjectivity. Moreover, it is precisely because in the course
of the preceding 700 pages Dickens has examined those machinations 
objectively that the mental acts whereby Miss Wade does not, as she 
claims, 1 habitually discerfn] the truth"^ but rather fabricates a 
psychologically fatal fiction reveal themselves for what they are: 
methods whereby the ego invades, conquers, recreates, and potentially
either clarifies or destroys the real.
4.
I
n *Why, will you pretend for to say,1 returned the 
Captain, *that they don’t distinguish the old from 
the young there as well as here?1
•They don11 make no distinguishments at all,1 said 
she. •They*re vastly too polite.1"
— Fanny Burney, Evelina
Although an underlying conception of fiction as epistemology
discloses itself to even a casual survey of the text, few studies
of Little Dorrit have acknowledged the sheer ubiquitousness of the
fictions it encompasses, let alone their efficacy to the consciousnesses
which generate them. Nor has any study taken the prevalence of fiction
as a point of origin for a comprehensive consideration of the novel
4as a work of and "about the moral imagination." Janice M. Carlisle
concludes that Little Dorrit concerns "the moral limits of the 
c
imagination,"-' but alludes only to the limitations that ultimately 
incomprehensible life imposes upon the novelist who attempts to 
record it accurately. In short, a puzzling critical myopia has pre­
cluded thorough analysis not just of the nature and function of 
fiction in the novel but, further, of the extent to which Dickens’s 
conception of fictive imagination qualifies Little Dorrit*s moral, 
social* and psychological design.
Certainly the novel*s preoccupation with "genteel fictions" has 
always intrigued scholars. Yet of recent critics only Carlisle has 
confronted the active role "good" characters play in upholding the 
illusions of gentility generally associated with odious Society.
Other examinations of the imaginative lives of characters in the novel 
usually assume, with Peter Christmas, a false polarity in which reality 
equals absence of fiction equals truth equals goodness, and appearance 
equals fiction equals fictive gentility equals evil* John Holloway, 
for example, declares emphatically that in Little Dorrit “seeming 
imprisons reality,*1^  and Roger Lund decides that the novel's concern 
with fiction extends only to 1 a fictional examination of an entire 
society built upon sands of hypocrisy, sham, and affectation.1 ? By 
the same token, interpretations like Carlisle's make too few distinctions 
among the kinds of fictionalization Little Dorrit illustrates.
Carlisle absolves Amy Dorrit of her prevarications on the marshy 
grounds that, given verisimilitude and mimesis as artistic ideals, the 
ambiguous and fundamentally amoral nature of reality necessitates 
the abandonment of 1 a straightforward and conventionally 'moral*
Q
posture” in favor of a more ambivalent one.
Elaine Showalter and Janet Larson assume that since Dickens was a 
fictionist his attitude toward anything created by the imagination 
could not have been other than inconclusive; like Carlisle, both critics 
do perceive the possibility that fictions can be useful as well as 
detrimental to the psyche, or to the society, that generates them.
But also like Carlisle, neither Showalter nor Larson recognizes the 
extent to which Dickens vindicates fictionalization not only as a 
primary but also as a primarily moral act of mind, Showalter, for 
example, concedes that “in order to preserve minimal self-esteem, 
[Marshalsea] inmates construct protective fictions, 'sad tales,' and 
false histories which allow self-pity to dominate their relationships 
with others,and even sees Dickens himself to employ certain tactful
and circumlocutory narrative devices (e.g., the use of doubles) in
10
order to protect the novelist*s own identity as a “benevolent figure.1
Showalter, however, concerns herself only with forms of lying that
preserve secrets and defend neurotic selves terrified of exposure:
fiction in bono emerges as little more than a thinly disguised
version of fiction in malo. Likewise, Randolph Splitter’s (psycho)analysis
of the imaginative constructions characters erect in the course of
the novel finds those constructions mere strategies designed to
expiate guilt symbolically; in addition, the “artifice" of the novel
itself derives from the "artificer*s“ neurasthenic desire to convince
himself “that the nightmare of modem society is only a nightmare, a
11dream, a fiction, after all."
Conversely^ but no less narrowly, Garrett Stewart supposes the
imaginative impulse in Little Dorrit an essentially good one which
allows its “heroes" (especially Arthur Clennam, with Little Dorrit*s
assistance) to escape from the oppressive confines of reality into
an "idyll in imagination." His hearty approbation of the imaginative
faculty prevents Stewart from considering the equally imaginative but
finally imprisoning “genteel fictions" so beloved of earlier critics,
and he quite overlooks the extent to which Clennam* s fancies serve
less to liberate than to isolate him.' At most, Stewart can only
remark that fancies like those of Flora Finching appear to be somewhat 
13"inefficacious" —  for the most part, he too neglects to identify 
the crucial differences among the imaginative acts Dickens dramatizes 
in Little Dorrit.
This critical tendency to “make no distinguishraents at all" has 
sanctioned a proliferation of partial illuminations of the novel
which fail both to make comprehensive sense of its explicitly narrative 
texture and to appreciate a source of unity fully as rich in implication 
as the famous prison symbol. It has further prevented scholars from 
relating Dickensfs aesthetic interest to the social and moral determi­
nations he makes. For Ian Watt, however, it is social 1 realism” that 
distinguishes the novel from other genres; the novel is special 
because it refers to a 1 reality which it imitates.1 ^  Furthermore, 
of all novels the Victorian would seem most intimately and directly 
concerned with an actuality primarily social. In a study of Carlyle, 
Macaulay, and Newman as imaginative writers, George Levine points out 
that in the Victorian conception "the crucial obligation of art is to 
be faithful to the real because it is in the real that people must 
live. And art’s function is to extend man’s capacity to sympathize 
with the creatures of the ordinary world among whom he must live.1 ^  
Such a directive unquestionably underlies Little Dorrit. Nothing 
of course absolutely requires that Dickens unite his analysis of the 
art and act of fiction with the social responsbility incumbent upon 
the nineteenth-century novelist. Nevertheless, Lionel Trilling’s 
pronouncement that "Little Dorrit is about society. . . .  It is more 
about society than any other of the novels. . .~. It is about society 
in its very essence"^ conforms even to the most general impression 
one forms of a novel originally intended as social satire. And indeed 
it is scarcely as if critics have not attempted to show the relation 
between the fictions evolved and perpetuated in Little Dorrit and the 
social vision the novel achieves. On the contrary, they have clung 
with a tenacity worthy of the Barnacles themselves to the image of 
Society as a tawdry illusion, which like the Marshalsea and Bleeding
8.
Heart Yard engages in "daily travesties of community"^ and whose
cultivated "surfaces" must be "broken through by the emancipating
1 ftreality underneath."A
Yet because limited to narrow perspectives on the techniques of
fictionalization Dickens explores in the course of Little Dorrit,
critical examinations of the connection between fiction and society
inevitably shortchange themselves. Even Nancy Hill*s study of the
picturesque in the novel —  although it finds satire of an aesthetic
standard to double as social satire —  concludes only that Dickens
"condemns" a "point of view substantially formed by the picturesque.,
the view that valued appearance more than substance, that believed
19surface could conceal sham." The relation between art and society 
in Little Dorrit remains infinitely more complex than will be 
apparent as long as fictions (ergo the society they unite) are 
invariably "bad" and continue to be regarded as something less than 
mental constructs that are ultimately as necessary and inevitable 
as Kantian categories of space and time to the apprehension of reality.
The real issue in Little Dorrit declares itself to be less the 
moral imagination, or the moral limits of the imagination, than the 
moral use of a perceptual donnee which turns out to be the imagination. 
If one begins with the premise Dickens articulates in the course of 
the novel —  fictions are necessary not, as Carlisle claims, because 
life itself has become so labyrinthine and indeterminate that it can 
only be confronted with lies, but rather because they permit the 
individual to orient himself to perplexing experience —  numerous 
possibilities for interpretation surface, especially with respect
9.
to the novel*s social dimensions. Trilling quite correctly noted that 
one of Dickens *s main concerns lies -with "society in its very essence,1 
and subsequent critics have correctly if implicitly identified that 
essence as fiction. Not simply "genteel," however, "fiction" in the 
novel demands to be construed as a primary and valuable source of social 
cohesion, and as a mode of communication and mutual comprehension as 
indispensable to social intercourse as to private psychic activity. 
Indeed, its social indispensability derives from its psychological 
inevitability. Little Dorrit encounters society in the abstract as 
well as Society in the concrete; the conclusions it reaches likewise 
transcend the notion of Society as sham. Even more important, the 
relation between aesthetic and morality —  between fiction and moral 
responsibility —  in the Dickensian imagination becomes apparent once 
one begins to examine the mechanics and the dynamics of the imaginative 
exchanges whereby something becomes nothing, poverty aristocracy, 
and imprisonment liberation.
II
"The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power 
and prime Agent of all human Perception,, and as a repe­
tition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation 
in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I con­
sider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the 
conscious will. . . .  It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, 
in order to recreate. • . • It is essentially vital, 
even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed 
and dead. Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters 
to play with but fixities and definites. The Fancy is 
indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from 
the order of time and space.
— Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, xiii
Structurally and thematically Little Dorrit appears to arrange
10.
itself into constellations of opposites. The "simple and radical con* 
trasts"^0 adumbrated in the "sun and shadow" of the opening chapter 
would seem to inform the novel at every level of its organization.
Thus Book One ("Poverty") counterpoints Book Two ("Riches"); mammoth 
and stationary^ the prison symbol finds its antithesis in the motif of 
"restless travellers" perpetually "climbing the dusty hills and toiling 
along the weary plains, journeying by land and journeying by sea, 
coming and going so strangely" (p. 6?). Throughout the narrative 
something and Someone oppose nothing and Nobody, and characters fall 
into contrasting dyads, so that the voluble Flora Finching appears 
almost inevitably in the company of her cryptic legacy, Mr. F.fs Aunt; 
enormous Maggy faithfully accompanies the diminutive Little Dorrit;
Pancks, "the little coaly steam tug," is frequently to be found with 
the "unwieldy ship" Christopher Casby in tow.
The dichotomies that form the novel* s surface on virtually every
front encourage a number of assumptions about its true design. It
seems logical, for example^ to suppose that one of the principal
dualities in Little Dorrit will comprise truth and falsehood, fiction
and reality, art and life. Hence Janet Larson concludes that "the
novel insists upon the saving power of ±he Real and teaches the perils
of Fiction,and Carlisle declares that in investigating the "instances
in which characters create ‘fictions* to hide the ‘reality* of their
feelings" she is simply examining "one aspect of the contrast" between
22seeming and being. An examination of the true nature of the 
dramatic juxtapositions that seem to govern Little Dorrit, however, 
reveals, quite simply, that no contrast in the novel is simple or, in 
the end, can be regarded as more than superficially a contrast. In
11.
fact, Dickens insists upon underlying affinities between opposites 
and ultimately upon their eradication.
For the relation between "fiction" and "reality," the subversion 
of all dichotomy acquires two implications. In the first place, 
although the novel witnesses the transformation of disparate entities 
into their polar opposites, this transformation is seldom if ever 
entirely objective. Rather, it comes about through the agency of 
various consciousnesses in the novel, and it comes about with a per­
sistence suggestive of inevitability. In the second place, the 
division between fiction and reality, like that between any other pair 
of traditionally yoked opposites, becomes indeterminate. Just as 
characters incessantly convert nothing into something and something 
into nothing, poverty into riches and darkness into light, so, invariably, 
they convert countryside into landscape, human group into tableau 
vivant, life into still life, reality into its fictional representation. 
In Little Dorrit art emerges as the psychic process which accomplishes 
that conversion. Mutatis mutandis, each character must be seen as a 
kind of artist engaged in the active and creative construction of a 
private version of reality.
Near the middle of Book One Amy Dorrit descends into the theatrical 
underworld. There she discovers "a maze of dust, • • . where there 
was such a confusion of unaccountable shapes of beams, bulkheads, 
brick walls, ropes, and rollers, and such a mixing of gaslight and 
daylight, that they seemed to have got on the wrong side of the 
pattern of the universe" (p. 279)* Just so, the visible universe 
Dickens creates in the course of Little Dorrit demands to be seen not,
12.
as Douglas Hewitt would have it, "in terms of violent contrasts,
23striking paraUels, repetitions" but rather in terms of patterns 
merging tirelessly into anti-patterns, of designs always busy turning 
themselves inside out and upside down. Little Dorrit occupies less
Oh.
a "world in reverse" governed by static paradigms which presuppose 
clear distinctions between unequivocal opposites than a world in 
reversal ruled by volatile principles of conversion.
To begin with the simplest and most obvious case in point, the 
novel1s encompassing framework depends only nominally upon a contrast 
between "Poverty" and "Riches." In his extreme indebtedness William 
Dorrit embodies poverty, yet his pretensions to gentility, like those 
of his equally impoverished offspring, escalate incdirecti proportion!to 
his insolvency. "It is certain that the more reduced and necessitous 
they were, the more pompously the skeleton [[fabricated "for the overawing 
of the College"]] emerged from its tomb" (pp. 277-78). The Dorrits and 
the Marshalsea collegians indefatigably convert their condition —  
indigence —  into its contrary —  affluence. More important, Dickens 
emphasizes only secondarily coexistent and contradictory states of 
destitution and illusory aristocracy, concentrating instead on the 
mysterious and subtle processes whereby for virtually all purposes of 
action material absence (poverty) becomes metaphysical presence (wealth). 
Testimonials and related rituals make up the prison life; the act of 
conversion supplants in importance the conversion itself, and William 
Dorrit retains his status only through repeated verbal and otherwise 
symbolic attestations to its existence.
On one level, Amy Dorrit*s incessant labor confirms her family*s
13.
impoverishment: as Blandois suggests, a gentleman does not work (1 *Have
you ever thought of looking to me to do any kind of work? • • .No!
You knew, from the first moment when you saw me here, that I was a 
gentleman? • • • Haha! You are right! A gentleman X am!8,1 []p. 4?]]) •
On at least two other levels, however, the relation between Amy,s 
willingness to work and the Dorrits1 poverty is dramatic rather than 
static. That willingness not only encourages "the family fiction" that 
"was the family assertion of itself against her services" (p. 280) , 
but even turns out to be an activity designed, not unlike the elaborate 
Testimonial ceremonies, to preserve the illusion of gentility. Indeed, 
in a grotesque parody of the act of earning, work becomes a way to 
convert "prison mendicity" into "fictive riches," for "over and above 
other daily cares , the Child of the Marshals ea had always upon her the 
care of preserving the genteel fiction that they were all idle beggars 
together" (p. 114). Amyfs wages go toward the maintenance of the one 
grand illusion that makes up her fatherfs life, and toward the 
dissolution of the novel*s antipodal structure.
Abetted by his fellow inmates* obliging participation in conversion 
rituals, and by his younger daughter*s active efforts to protect the 
fagade that ultimately defines him, "William the bond" is functionally 
identical to the great and wonderful Merdle. Always "receiving homage" 
from the collegians of Society, Merdle represents the annihilation of 
all distinction between "Poverty" and "Riches," an annihilation effected 
only through the agency of the collective imagination. Merdle*s wealth 
turns out to be a fabrication made possible by the monetary and moral 
confidence invested in him. Society (comprising both society in general 
and Society in particular) essentially imagines him into being. The
Merdle legends that circulate in Bleeding Heart Yard ("his ways being, 
as you might say and utter no falsehood, paved with gold" £p. 628]]) only 
reiterate the mythic grandeur with which society at large endows "the 
rich man, who had in a manner revised the New Testament, and already 
entered the kingdom of Heaven" (p. 673) • Of course, Merdle1 s assets 
show themselves to be nothing more than "ethereal vapour,.. . . • moonshine," 
fully as insubstantial as the communal fantasies that transform a 
veritable prince of darkness into "the shining wonder, the new con­
stellation to be followed by the wise men bringing gifts" (p. 777)*
The Merdle speculations by definition involve a kind of profane 
transubstantiation in which nothing seems able to become something, and 
indeed appears to do so. But, significantly, even had Merdle*s wealth 
existed independent of public belief in its reality, it would have re­
mained nothing: intrinsically worthless, money acquires value only in
terras of that for which it may be exchanged, and social fancy
2 ‘yultimately makes nothing out of nothing. Merdle himself destroys 
binary oppositions that, because destructible, prove never to have 
existed in the first place, and thus Barnacle, with ironic accuracy, 
pronounces him "one of the greatest converters of the root of all evil 
into the root of all good" (p. 297)*
Dickens by no means restricts the metamorphosis of "Poverty" into its 
equally intangible counterpart to simple reversals of fortune, or to the 
converging biographies of William Dorrit and Mr. Merdle. "Genteel" at 
last, Dorrit in fancy exchanges his newly acquired wealth for the old 
life of poverty and. indebtedness and in the end "kn[ows]] nothing beyond 
the Marshalsea." Although initially Dorrit*s imagination transposes only 
past and present, so that during his "collapse in good company" he
merely reassumes the role he played throughout his imprisonment, the 
real transposition takes place between wealth and impoverishment, and 
Dorrit spends his last days in a sumptuous bedchamber sending his 
possessions "piece by piece, to an imaginary pawnbrokerfs" (p. 712).
The end of the novel affirms in a different way that the relation of 
poverty to riches is one less of irreconcilable opposition than of 
affinity underscored by a common unreality. The affinity itself 
originates in the mediating power of the imagination, which finds 
equally illusory both the presence of money and its absence, and 
so negotiates freely between them. Declaring her "*own great fortune1" 
to be "fnothing in the world(p. 885) , Amy Dorrit converts material 
poverty into metaphysical riches ("*I never was rich before. . . .*"), 
quite transforming one of the central contrasts in the novel. The 
codicil-burning verifies not only that transformation, but further 
the unique power of the imagination to effect.it. The suppressed 
codicil indicates definitely neither financial gain on Amy’s part 
nor financial loss on the part of the Clennam trust. It is simply 
1,1 anything you like best*" (p. 893)*
The point at the moment is less to argue for the wider implications 
of such transactions between contrasting poles than to suggest that 
Little Dorrit asks to be read as a universe of opposites continually 
dissolving into each other under the auspices of the imagination.
More than anything else, the novel*s dynamic is one of movement, of 
translation and change reflected in chapter headings ("Moving in 
Society"; "Machinery in Motion") and in motifs of literal translation 
which center on interpretation itself, so that more important than
16.
Cavallettofs Italian or its English equivalent are Mrs. Flemish*s 
happy compromises between the two. Hampton Court exemplifies the 
structural and thematic translations that penetrate the deepest 
levels of the novel and undermine even its most emphatically stated 
polarities, subordinating all of them to the image of a world in 
transition. Dickens*s narrative catches in the act of transformation 
the glorified tents of the "gipsies of gentility":
There was a temporary air about their establish­
ments, as if they were going away the moment they 
could get anything better. . . . Genteel blinds 
and makeshifts were more or less observable as 
soon as their doors were opened; screens not half 
high enough, which made dining rooms out of arched 
passages; . • . curtains which called upon you 
to believe that they didn*t hide anything; panes of 
glass which requested you not to see them; many 
objects of various forms, feigning to have no 
connection with their guilty secret, a bed (p. 359)*
Even sun and shadow merge by the end of the narrative, when "the last 
day of the appointed week touched the bars of the Marshalsea gate.
Black, all night, since the gate had clashed upon Little Dorrit, its 
iron stripes were turned by the early-glowing sun into stripes of 
gold" (p. 831).
It will be seen at once that all the dismantled antitheses in 
Little Dorrit ultimately express, synecdochally, the wider antithesis 
that encompasses them —  the fiction and reality opposition so beloved 
of critics. One knows, of course, that the Dorrits are actually in 
debt, that Hampton Court really is as cramped and noisome as it pretends 
not to be. But in dissolving dichotomies —  in concentrating on the 
symbolic acts that effect such dissolutions, and on the process of 
dissolution itself —  Dickens also appears to dissolve the old
17.
familiar seeming and being antinomy. Just as the novel confronts 
squarely no unequivocal example either of Riches or of Poverty, and 
no situation in which empirical and imagined destitution coexist, so 
all customary distinctions between reality and the versions of reality 
characters create for themselves evaporate. Indeed** the primary 
conversion in Little Dorrit, and the one in which characters engage 
.even as they conceive of imprisonment as liberation, or of indebtedness 
as solvency, is of life into a representation of life.
The Dickensian technique of disclosing unexpected and startling 
similarities between seemingly dissimilar characters reaches its 
zenith in Little Dorrit, where characters like John Chivery and 
Edmund Sparkler, Christopher Casby and William Dorrit, Mr. Meagles 
and Mrs. Merdle, make very unlikely bedfellows indeed. Dickens 
establishes one of the most perplexing affinities in the novel, 
however, between Amy Dorrit and Mr. Merdle. In Italy, "all [Amy] 
saw appeared unreal; the more surprising the scenes , the more they 
resembled the unreality of her own inner life as she went among its 
vacant places all day long" (p. 517)• Little Dorrit is incontestably 
one of Dickens*s most virtuous characters; yet in Book One one of 
his most unequivocal villains, Mr. Merdle, likewise "looked out of 
nine windows in succession, and appeared to see nine wastes of 
space",(p. 449). Little Dorrit itself does not offer a sharper 
moral disparity than the one between Amy and Merdle, but the two 
manage to share the one perceptual habit common to everyone around 
them, and so habitually transform what they see into a fanciful 
version of itself. Perhaps paradoxically, only when Merdle and Amy 
are understood to orient themselves to experience in the same way do
18.
the true and crucial differences between their perspectives reveal 
themselves. Otherwise, the "vacant spaces" Amy sees appear equivalent 
to the "wastes of space" that rise to meet Merdle*s eyes.
The medieval conception of fantasy as a cognitive process which 
accurately reproduces sense impressions and presents them to the 
organizing mind finds its nineteenth-century avatar in Little Dorrit, 
where fantastic translations of life into representations of life 
transpire continually. Even in Book One, long before the Dickensian 
sleight of pen that changes an entire country into a painted landscape, 
William Dorrit occupies the position of a "serious picture in the 
obscure gallery of the Marshalsea" (p. 273)* Just so, Dickens depicts 
most of the members of the Dorrit family as "avenging illustration^]" 
in a "satire on family pride" (p. 277) • Such descriptive devices 
merely objectify a psychological or epistemic disposition to replace 
the actual with the artificial, and, in a related vein, to substitute 
the subjective (the inner world the mind creates for itself) for the 
objective (the world external to and independent of the creative mind).
Blandois provides an extreme but apt example of a kind of 
self-reflexive alchemy that renders even self-consciousness (and 
self-approbation) acts of aesthetic appreciation/ nlI love and study 
the picturesque in all its varieties,*" Blandois boasts. "fI have 
been called picturesque myself1" (p. 408). Blandois fashions his own 
"picturesque"'being so skillfully that the artificer himself becomes 
artificial. Blandois considers "genuine" and "picturesque," "nature" 
and "character" synonymous, and the ease with which he exchanges one 
name and identity for another testifies to his imaginative dexterity.
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But as D. W. Jefferson notes, Blandois "exists to create the impression
2 6 ’of something which is not there," and one can go even further to
argue that Blandois is "not there": in fabricating himself he simply
illustrates the double truth of the maxim that nothing will come of
nothing. Thus when Flintwinch ventures that he may be "not of a
pious cast," Blandois rejoins: ,,(t0n the contrary. . • . It's a
part of my character. I am sensitive, ardent, conscientious, and
imaginative. A sensitive, ardent, conscientious, and imaginative man,
Mr. Flintwinch, must be that, or nothing!1" In turn, there appears "an
inkling of suspicion in Mr. Flintwinch1 s face that he might be
nothing" ( p. 408) .
The caricature of a villain, Blandois seems always to be stepping 
either into or back out of a melodrama. Even Henry Gowan (whom Miss 
Wade perceives as "the dressed-up Death in the Dutch series" []p. 732]) 
finds "a pleasure in setting up Blandois as the type of elegance, and 
making him a satire upon others who piqued themselves on personal 
graces" (p. 5^2). In much the same way, Arthur Clennam comes upon 
the eminent Tite Barnacle, who "seemed to have been sitting for his 
portrait to Sir Thomas Lawrence all the days of his life" (p. 152) 
and who, in Merdle's company, shares "a strong general resemblance to 
the two cows in the Cuyp picture over them" (p. 6l6). The impulse 
to turn all experience into a fictive representation of experience 
asserts itself in Italy as well as in England. Returning from the 
latter country, William Dorrit can only establish a primarily 
aesthetic distance between himself and the sight of his brother and 
younger daughter together before the firs: "Allowing for the great
difference in the still-life of the picture, the figures were much
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the same as of old; his brother being sufficiently like himself to 
represent himself, for a moment, in the composition1 (p. 699)- Even 
Edward Sparkler translates what he sees into a "composition with Miss 
Fanny in the foreground" (p. 515)-
Sitting in Casby*s house, Arthur Clennam recognizes imagination 
as the necessary mode of apprehension it is: "In a word, it was re­
presented (Clennam called to mind, alone in the ticking parlour*) that 
many people select their models, much as the painters just now 
mentioned, select theirs" (p. 190). Indeed, the passage emphasizes 
not that some "people select their models," whereas others do not, 
but rather that "many people select their models" while others have 
their models thrust upon them. The ubiquitous reliance upon "models" 
equalizes everyone in the novel. On the surface, little distinguishes 
Mrs. Gowan, who with a turn of the tongue reduces the Meagleses to the 
"Miggleses," from the Meagleses themselves, who make Harriet Beadle 
into Tattycorara. Mrs. Gowan*s imaginative transpositions replace 
an actuality with its mirror image, false, desirable, exactly inverting 
the thing it reflects: "With the utmost politeness and good-breeding,
she feigned that it was she —  not [Mr. Meagles*] —  who had made the 
difficulty, and who at length gave way; and that the sacrifice was 
hers —  not his" (p. ^40). Similarly, the Meagleses also alter 
experiential givens in order to make the world habitable for themselves, 
not only in the sense that Pet*s dead twin is 111 changed . . . according 
to the changes in the child spared to us and always with us1" (p. 58), 
but also in the more disturbing sense that the Tattycoram they create 
is designed to corroborate a comfortable (and inaccurate) world view.
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111 Why, she was called in the Institution Harriet Beadle,1,1 Mr. Meagles 
explains, 1,1 —  an arbitrary name, of course* Now, Harriet we changed 
into Hattey, and then into Tatty, because, as practical people, we 
thought even a playful name might be a new thing to her, and might 
have a softening and affectionate kind of effect, donft you see? As 
to Beadle, that I neednft say was wholly out of the question. If 
there is anything that is not to be tolerated on any terms . . .  it 
is a beadle11 (p. 57).
In much the same way, Arthur Clennara frequently finds "himself a 
long way on the road to a number of airier and less substantial 
destinations1 than the ones that actually await him (p. 231). But 
William Dorrit also consistently and even compulsively builds 1 castles 
in the air1' that so insinuate themselves into the deceptively simple 
act of observation that he fails to notice his surroundings. And 
Affery, resident equally of haunted house and haunted mind, effects 
the quintessential transformation of matter into mental energy, until 
all experience presents itself to her in the guise of a dream. Yet 
Dickens suggests a disconcerting parallel between Affery and Amy Dorrit, 
who also seems to perceive much of the worll in terms of what it is 
not. Looking into Arthur Clennan^s “dim room," for instance, she sees 
"a spacious one . . . and grandly furnished," informed by her own 
"courtly ideas of Covent Garden . . . costly ideas of Covent Garden 
. • . picturesque ideas of Covent Garden" (p. 208). The other guests 
at the "party" she attends later in the chapter are in reality nothing 
more than stars, yet "such a vista of wonder opened out before her, 
that she sat looking up at the stars, quite lost" (p. 217).
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In short, the question of "distinguishments" poses itself again 
and again. It seems impossible to condemn the fictive lenses through 
which Mrs. Gowan, William Dorrit, and Affery view the world without 
condemning all of the imaginative acts in the novel. Part of the 
difficulty of making distinctions stems from the very nature of the 
world Dickens figures forth in Little Dorrit, for this world stead­
fastly resists its own figuring forth, and remains to the last a 
shadowy, mysterious, and finally incomprehensible nether-region 
where conclusions must be at last inconclusive. Objective indeterminacy 
throws the mind back upon its own resources in its struggle to orient 
itself to experience; the transmutation of what seems to be into its 
opposite simply furnishes one method of rendering the world sensible, 
hence tolerable. The recasting of experience into a fanciful version 
of itself —  into a picture or a dream —  supplies another. Only a 
closer examination of related techniques of representation, however, 
finds any sort of consistent correspondence between what one senses 
to be the novel*s moral truth and the aesthetic determinations it 
makes. Yet the transgressions and abuses of the evil characters and 
institutions in Little Dorrit ultimately identify themselves as 
transgressions against and abuses of the imagination.which, because a 
necessary accomplice to perception and comprehension, emerges as a 
defining feature of humanity. Likewise, Dickens at last locates the 
chief moral and social good in the conscionable use of the imaginative, 
and specifically of the narrative, faculty.
"Society, the Circumlocution Office, and Mr. Gowan," Dickens said
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of Little Dorrit, "are of course three parts of one idea and design." f
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Although Dickens referred to the satirical dimensions of the novel,
Society, the Circumlocution Office, and "Mr. Gowan" are also three 
parts of the same imaginative design, for each of them embodies some 
perversion of the artistic act. In dramatizing those perversions,
Dickens measures also the dimensions of any aesthetic enterprise, in 
much the way that any satirical distortion ultimately emphasizes the 
right and desirable proportions of what it depicts in exaggerated form. 
Imaginative failures in Little Dorrit reflect less an inability to 
fictionalize experience than a deeper failure to apprehend a trans­
literal reality. Culpability originates in the fact that although the 
ego apparently cannot choose but view the world through a scrim of 
reverie, it nonetheless retains a great deal of choice about what it 
will represent to itself, and about how it will represent it.
Mrs. Gowan congratulates her friend Mrs. Merdle upon "represeni£ing[] 
and expressing] Society so well" (p. 44l) , and indeed both women —  
both of whom consider heart and Art reciprocal metaphors rather than 
the metonyms they should be —  stand in synecdochal relation to Society, 
and to the kind of art in which Society engages. That species of art 
may be summarizes as the art of varnishing, and its particular repre- 
hensibility lies not so much in the fact that its way of converting 
apprehended moral realities is to efface them entirely as in the 
corollary to that fact: such effacement requires the conscious and
deliberate rejection of the possibility of representing reality accurately, 
and so becomes a sin both of omission and of commission.
Varnishing, Dickens stresses, is not an involuntary act; nearly
always it follows a necessarily imaginative perception of some true state
Hdng the empirical smokescreen. The real wretchedness
# is more apparent to the members of Society than to
' *'1 ■
t tf the ardor of their efforts to repress and deny it 
evidence of that truth, Mrs. Merdle*s rhetorical 
It is Mrs. Merdle who somehow manages to impart central 
* * .v'i@ty at the same time that she turns her back upon 
* not in our natural state,111 Mrs. Merdle remarks,
"•Society suppresses us and dominates us111 (p. 286).
Mrs. Gowan 1 of course saw through her own threadbare 
*■:* and . • • knew that Mrs. Merdle saw through it perfectly, 
that Society would see through it perfectly,1 and yet 
of "immense complacency and gravity" (p. Wt). 
because Fanny knows down to the last screw the mechanisms 
y operates that she becomes such a singular sensation.
I*IvAtion of surfaces naturally (or unnaturally, as the case 
the dogma wherein all of Society*s faith resides. 
^rnlsher1 William Dorrit and the "fair varnisher" Mrs. 
ally personify the choice to erase all intimations of 
»r than engage in the imaginative enterprise that would 
1 orionize it into a coherent representation of a moral 
l conceives of art —  the imaginative perception of 
' lying potentially deceptive experience —  as work,
^ r« emphasizes that it is not the character of gentility 
’ ' ’ ‘ff3neral*s insistence that "everything [be] surface and 
- <>w without substance" (p. 557) merely articulates the 
*5 • on not venture further into the wilderness of
n need be. Thus it comes as no surprise that Casby,
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a "mere Inn sign post without any Inn" (p. 190), should embody simul­
taneously superficiality and indolence: the two in Dickens go hand
in hand. Indeed, Casbyfs patriarchal utterances follow a syntactical 
pattern of repetition that signifies his imaginative torpor.
Part of the aesthetic stagnation Dickens depicts in Little Dorrit 
stems from art’s inability to illustrate anything other than surface, 
and from the modem artist’s inability to recreate what he sees in any 
image other than his own. Little Dorrit establishes art as the 
primary human profession, but Gowan, the explicit artist figure, 
"applies himself to his profession very little" (p. 606). Further, 
just as Society chooses to believe only in surfaces, and so to believe 
in nothing, so Gowan "has no belief in anyone else, because he has 
no belief in himself" (p. 606). The Casbys of the world provide 
perfect subjects for the Gowans of the world: Casby "had been accosted
in the streets, and respectfully solicited to become a Patriarch for 
painters and for sculptors" (p. 187). Similarly, Italy’s "picturesque" 
surface lures professional (that is, professed) artists precisely 
because it only appears to be.
Henry Gowan can represent nothing. In the logical terms Little 
Dorrit not only invites but reinforces, this means both that he lacks 
the imagination to glimpse, and hence to represent, anything (he can 
represent nothing) and that he is able to glimpse, and hence to 
represent quite accurately, what it nothing (he can represent nothing). 
Little Dorrit observes most delicately that, with respect to his 
portrait of her father, "I am not quite convinced I should have known 
fit] from the likeness if I had not seen him doing it" (p. 606), yet 
Gowan’s portrait of Blandois turns out to be an exact, if inadvertent,
image of multi valence and essential nothingness. In other words, in 
its failure to represent anything in particular, the portrait ironically 
captures Blandois himself perfectly, for Blandois lacks identity.
Thus when Amy and Fanny visit his studio, Gowan invites them to "’at 
least see the original of the daub, that fyou] may know what it’s 
meant for.*" The "original of the daub," however, is himself "a 
bravo waiting for his prey, a distinguished noble waiting to save 
his country, the common enemy waiting to do somebody a bad turn, an 
angelic messenger waiting to do somebody a good turn —  whatever you 
think he most looks like!’" (p. 5^5)• Gowan is in the true sense of 
the word no artist at all, and he is no artist because he refuses to 
confront the intimate relation between art and reality. In failing to 
realize that the artistic imagination provides the only possible means 
of apprehending anything other than the surfaces of things, Gowan 
becomes a kind of criminal of the imagination. Marrying art to artifice, 
he, like Society, divorces it from reality. For him, to live the life 
of the artist is to "’pass the bottle of smoke. To keep up the pretence 
as to labour, and study, and patience, and being devoted1" (p. ^52).
Art itself, its earning power aside, equals "’hocus-pocus.1"
To Society’s aid, of varnishing moral reality, and to the Gowanesque 
art of denying art’s relation to what can in fact be known only through 
the intercession of the active imagination, Dickens yokes "the great art 
How not to do it" (p. ^55)• The Circumlocution Office reveals its 
raison d’etre to be the artful dodging of reality itself —  an art at 
last as deceptive (and hence as antithetical to true art) as the 
surfaces cultivated by the Merdle coterie, or as the perverse sort 
of naturalism at which Henry Gowan excels. The engaging young
mouthpiece of the Circumlocution Office, Ferdinand Barnacle, glibly 
describes its essence:
"Why good Heaven, we are nothing but forms!
Think what a lot of forms you have gone through,
And you have never got any nearer to an end?1
"Never," said Clennam.
"Look at it from the right point of view, and 
there you have us —  official and effectual" (p. 804) •
The "whole Science of Government" turns out to be the perpetual 
generation of memoranda, and of memoranda designed to promote a 
veneer of efficiency that lures and vanquishes the real.
Equally important, however, Dickens depicts the art of circum­
locution as a falsely imaginative and hence immoral act of apprehension: 
"Whatever was required to be done, the Circumlocution Office; was 
beforehand with all the public departments in the art of perceiving —  
HOW NOT TO DO IT" (p. 1^ 5) • Society, in perpetual motion, varnishes 
and converts reality until it has reduced it to homogeneity, and 
indeed to the Dickensian bete noir, anonymity. Thus Mrs. General,
Bar, Jury, Bishop, and the other "courtiers of the Great and Wonderful 
Merdle" (who like his wife and Mrs. Gowan bears no Christian name) 
are all in effect innominate. Similarly, the Circumlocution Office, 
concerned only with "keeping this wonderful, all-sufficient wheel of 
statesmanship, How not to do it, in motion" (p. 1^6), moves toward 
the annihilation of all identity. Its offense against the real is 
also and equally an imaginative and perceptual crime: because the
Circumlocution Office makes no distinctions among the suppliants 
who wander into its line of vision, it automatically converts them 
into a single faceless, nameless throng whose members may be "all
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indiscriminately tucked up under £its] foolscap paper" (p. 146).
The three modes of art that Society, Gowan, and the Circumlocution 
Office exemplify represent three modes of denial, and three disjunctions 
between, reality and its imitation. Ultimately Dickens condemns all 
three forms of artistry on both aesthetic and moral grounds. Having 
established art as a primary act of mind, Little Dorrit dramatizes 
both the abuse and the perversion of the imaginative faculty; in 
dramatizing those abuses and perversions, it insists all the more 
emphatically on art’s status as a primary act of mind. The Circumlocution 
Office, Henry Gowan, and Society all exploit mercilessly the same 
technique of fictionalization whereby the ego orients itself to 
experience. In each case, the fictive capacity only rearranges 
experience itself, failing to penetrate imaginatively the shadows 
and contradictions which unquestionably compose the sensible world —  
choosing to interpret them literally rather than anagogically. Mrs. 
Clennam, and to an extent even Arthur, with his unchecked inclination 
to regard himself as an old man, also distort their own imaginative 
perspicacity, converting what they perceive into a fictive barrier 
which effectively isolates them psychically from the rest of the 
human world. Though more complex than those of Society and the 
Circumlocution Office, their imaginative machinations also constitute 
complete or partial failures of the representative and active 
imagination.
In his "Meditations on a Hobby Horse," E. H. Gombrich destinguishes 
between the conventional notion of visual art as a representation of 
reality and his own conception of art as a substitution for reality 
designed expressly to meet the needs of the artist. Gombrich does
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not go so far as to suppose that something originally intended (of 
necessity) to represent reality can become a substitute for it, but 
in Little Dorrit Dickens explores such a possibility. Mrs. Clennam 
provides only the most obvious example of the way objective phenomena 
may be translated into their subjective doubles. Like that of Miss 
Wade, hers is essentially a mind-forged world whose salient features 
have been borrowed from an array of experiential, givens, distorted, 
and admixed to corroborate a terrible private creed. 1 ’The change 
I await here,”1 Mrs. Clennam informs anyone who will listen, n!is 
the great change*"; yet in the present sense, she "awaits" no change 
at all but continually effects it. Her "Bible, bound like her own 
construction of it" (p. 69), objectifies the extent to which fiction 
has become a substitute for a psychological and spiritual reality. 
Dickens indicates in his monthly number plans for Little Dorrit an 
intention to show "people like the houses they inhabit,"^ and at 
least with respect to her inoral condition, Mrs. Clennam’s "dim 
bed-chamber," with its "black bier-like sofa" and "smell of black 
dye" composes a telling aesthetic.
Not, however, simply an objective correlative for Mrs. Clennam’s 
repressive state of mind, her bedroom also distinguishes itself 
because she has created it ("she never changed her room"), because 
quite literally she cannot see beyond it, and because it is equally 
illusory and actual. An early and omniscient description of the 
room underscores its phantasmagorical quality, annihilating all 
division between its objective and its subjective features:
. . .when it was dusk there early in the afternoon, 
changing distortions of herself in her wheeled 
chair, of Mr. Flintwinch with his wry neck, of
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Mistress Affery coming and going, would be 
thrown upon the house wall, . • . and would 
hover there like shadows from a great magic 
lantern. As the room-ridden invalid settled 
for the night, these would gradually disappear: 
Mistress Affery*s magnified shadow always 
flitting about, last, until it finally glided 
away into the air. . . . Then the solitary 
light would burn unchangingly, until it 
burned pale before the dawn, and at last died 
under the breath of Mrs. Affery, as her shadow 
descended on it from the witch-region of 
sleep (p. 221).
Perception in Mrs. Clennam1 s case ultimately takes the shape of 
imaginative conception; "unable to measure the changes beyond £her] 
view by any larger standard than the shrunken one of [[her] own 
uniform and contracted existence" (p. 3Q8), Mrs. Clennam unconsciously 
forces experience to conform to, and at last to confirm, an 
especially terrifying dogma whose reality and whose fictional!ty 
become identical.
Like numerous other characters in Little Dorrit, Mrs. Clennam 
perverts the human creative faculty by "breath^ing] her own image into 
a clay image of her Creator." Yet for Dickens reality cannot be 
known except insofar as the mind represents it to itself, and by 
the logic the novel establishes, Mrs. Clennam could not hope to know 
her "Creator" except insofar as she created him; i.e., except insofar 
as she inferred his existence from the experiential particulars that 
surrounded her. In Affery, who turns out to have been, "like greater 
people, right in her facts, and always wrong in the theories she 
deduced from them" (p. 863)* Dickens provides several clues about 
the feature unifying all of the fictions in the novel, for, broken 
down into its constituent parts, the imaginative act loosely parallels
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the pattern of deductive reasoning. The Dickensian imagination 
rpoves from the great general facts of existence, which in their 
murkiness demand that theories be constructed to explain them, to 
the smaller fragments which reflect and clarify them. Such a pattern 
is of course finally inductive rather than deductive: experience
at last confesses itself subordinate to wider truths that underlie 
it. Nevertheless, knowing is clearly imaginative and inferential, 
mimetic only in the Platonic sense of mirrors and caves. One 
simultaneously creates and discovers what one knows.
So it is that "no human eyes have ever seen more daring, gross, 
and shocking images of the Divine nature than we creatures of the 
dust make in our own likeness, of our own bad passions" (p. 8*l4). The 
"Divine nature" provides one potential ordering of reality which 
would seem to be less prior to the mind than created by it and which, 
because of the faith invested in it, becomes functionally real. The 
past provides another, and in Little Dorrit memory emerges as one 
mode of apprehending (through fictional lenses) the real. Thus 
legacies invariably bequeath realities —  the terse and uncompromising 
truth, for example, that Mr. F.*s Aunt chirps at appropriate moments 
("•You danrt make a head and brains out of a brass knob with nothing 
in it!1" £p. 319])* or the "life of degradation" William Dorrit 
cannot avoid "bestowing . . .  as a sort of portion" (p. 275) upon 
his daughter Amy, or the moral imperative ("Do Not Forget") Clennam*s 
father bequeaths his son and widow.
Conspicuous throughout the novel, "D.N.F." exemplifies the past 
as a reality the present inherits. Significantly, "D.N.F." also becomes
a kind of Victorian Rorschach, acquiring a different meaning for 
anyone who looks upon it, and, for all purposes of thought and action, 
becoming whatever it is believed to be. Mrs. Clennam’s response to 
the monogrammed watchcase epitomizes the technique of fictionalization 
whereby the ego recreates a reality to its own satisfaction simply 
by "deducing theories" from the facts, and gradually coming to believe 
in them. "D.N.F." speaks to Mrs. Clennam "’like a voice from an 
angry cloud. Do not forget the deadly sin, do not forget the appointed 
discovery, do not forget the appointed suffering'" (p. 8^ 4). Blandois!s 
interpretation of this most ambiguous of texts likewise depends upon 
its translation into his own particularly sinister language: "’D.N.F.
was some tender, lovely, fascinating fair-creature, I make no doubt,’" 
he decides. "’I adore her memory on the assumption'" (p. 405). Mrs. 
Clennam’s and Blandois*s versions of "D.N.F." contrast sharply with 
that of Arthur Clennam, who, characteristically, reads the monogram 
as an injunction to make reparation.
Memory itself , however, demands to be seen as one means by which 
the present may be converted into an alternative version of iself.
While remembrance of things past in itself can assist in the apprehension 
of the real, the act of recollection also proves eminently capable 
of obscuring and altering present circumstance. Flora Finching and 
Arthur Clennam furnish the most dramatic examples of the way memory 
can assist in the fictionalization of the present moment by converting 
material experience into an immaterial equivalent. But they are 
definitely not the only exemplars of such an imaginative technique, 
serving rather as foils for Amy Dorrit*s more truly imaginative 
orientation to memory and to the past.
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The "moral mermaid," Flora Finching, is a creature half of the 
romanticized past and half of a present she romanticizes by insisting 
upon its identity to the past. Upon his reunion with his rose turned 
effusive peony, Arthur Clennam notes immediately the "inconsistent 
and profoundly unreasonable way in which she instantly went on, 
nevertheless7 to interweave their long-abandoned boy and girl relations 
with their present interview" (p. 195). This is of course the 
technique whereby Flora makes the present psychologically habitable, 
and it is equally an imaginative and a linguistic strategy that allows 
her to envelop herself in a fantastic verbal cloak wherein all dis­
tinctions between past and present evaporate: "'Very polite of you to
say so, Arthur —  cannot remember Hr. Clennam until the word is out, 
such is the habit of times forever fled, and so true it is that oft 
in the stilly night ere slumber's chain has bound people, fond memory 
brings the light of other days around people" (p. 315).
Yet for Clennam himself, memory also transforms the present, 
recasting immediate experience in the image of the past. Thus at the 
beginning of the novel Clennam returns as much to his own childhood as 
to London, and in the coffeehouse listens to a bell whose "sound had 
revived a long train of miserable Sundays, and the procession would not 
stop with the bell, but continued to march on," returning him to the 
"dreary Sunday^ s^ j of his childhood" (p. 69). Whereas Flora mixes 
memory and desire, for Clennam memory remains until the final chapters 
a source of pain which falsifies the present as thoroughly as do his 
erstwhile beloved's imaginative transpositions. Garrett Stewart observes 
that memory is to Arthur "no balm but merely a chill restorative of his 
blighted past,"^ and this is true as far as it goes. At last, however,
Clennam1s memory becomes an epistemological tool; Clennam finally 
replaces the present with the past in order to apprehend a moral 
reality. Such an act is in itself imaginative, a fictive means to a 
very real end. Elaine Showalter observes that in the Marshalsea 
Clennam spends his time "in the cultivation of his own memory, the 
'right kind of remembering1 which is a precondition of growth." In­
terested only in the psychic dimensions of Clennam*s imprisonment,
30Showalter can see his only as a "meditation on self-knowledge," 
but, equally important, it is only through a kind of mental alchemy 
that Clennam transposes past and present. Consequently, his 
"meditation" is not simply on "self-knowledge," but ultimately upon 
the moral constants underlying the variables and ephemera of empirical 
experience. Such constants, suggested in the flowers Amy Dorrit leaves 
Clennam and eventually in her own spectral figure, gradually replace 
the miasma of sensory experience that surrounds and sickens him in 
the early stages of his imprisonment.
Dickens's insistence that the artificers who "represent Society so 
well," Mrs. Merdle and Christopher Casby, speak habitually in "the 
imperative mood present tense" leads one to suspect that the truth can 
only be narrated in the subjunctive mood past tense. Just so, in the 
Marshalsea Arthur Clennam essentially tells himself "his own poor 
story," and specifically the history of his relation with Little Dorrit. 
Such a mode of reflection allows him to verify John Chiveiy's suggestion 
that Amy loves him and is at once reflective, narrative, and 
imaginative, involving a number of hypothetical transpositions ("Con­
sider the improbability, - . . . consider the improbability" £p. 798]; 
"Granted that she had loved him, and he had known it and had suffered
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himself to love her. ..." \jp. 801]), and culminating in the organi­
zation of all experience around a single point of reference whose 
actuality can only be comprehended through an imaginative act of faith: 
"Looking back upon his own poor story, she was its vanishing-point"
(p. 801). The vanishing-point passage deserves further explication, 
and will receive as much below; in the present context, the passage 
affirms simultaneously the triumph of the imaginative memory over 
circumstance and the victory of the actual and the permanent over 
the artificial and evanescent.
One of the Dorrit family's main transgressions, upon its accession 
to "Riches," centers on its refusal to remember. The chief wrong 
it does its youngest member is to forget the past. Only Frederick 
Dorrit (who, tellingly, also "had insensibly acquired a new habit of 
shuffling into the picture-galleries . . . and passing hours and 
hours before the portraits of renowned Venetians, . . . silently 
presenting £his niece Amy] to the noble Venetians" [p. 53^ ]) masters 
the art of memory. Such an imaginative act of faith instills in an 
always murky and indistinct present a kind of clarity and coherence —  
by viewing it in the mirror the past provides, Frederick Dorrit 
manages to understand the present as it is. Frederick observes no 
difference between present riches and past impoverishment, appearing 
in Book Two exactly as he appeared in Book One and identifying at 
once the failure of perception that becomes a moral and imaginative 
failure as his brother's family forgets its indebtedness to Little 
Dorrit.
Little Dorrit herself would seem to excel at the imaginative 
conversion of present into past, but her talent for doing so surfaces
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only in the second half of the novel; her fidelity to the prison life 
renders both that life and the life in Italy equally unreal: "With
a remembrance of her father's old life in prison hanging about her 
like the burden of a sorrowful tune, Little Dorrit would wake from 
a dream of her birth-place into a whole day's dream" (p. 517)• In 
their common unreality, past and present become interchangeable, and 
thus Amy appears simply to trade the new world for the old one:
All that she saw was new and wonderful, but it 
was not real; it seemed to her as if those visions 
of mountains and picturesque countries might melt 
away at any moment, and the carriage, turning 
some abrupt comer, bring up with a jolt at the 
old Marshalsea gate" (p. 516).
Indeed, throughout the novel, Dickens emphasizes the imagination's 
free passage back and forth between the poles it regards as equally 
illusory, bat if Amy simply exchanged past for present, little would 
distinguish her imagination from the one that very nearly destroys 
Arthur Clennam; if she indiscriminately wove past and present together, 
no real distinction would emerge between her continental reverie and 
Flora Finching's flights of fancy. What Amy does, however, is to 
turn both the past and the present into mutually qualifying frames of 
reference, each of which, imposed imaginatively upon its opposite, 
ultimately defines it. Consequently, Amy "would lean upon her balcony, 
and look over at the water, as though they all £all the scenes of her 
past] lay underneath it. WTien she got to that, she would musingly 
watch its running, as if, in the general vision, it might run dry, and 
show her the prison again, and herself, and the old room, and the old 
inmates, and the old visitors: all lasting realities that had never
changed" (p. 520).
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At first glance, Amy Dorrit*s private fictions appear to be ex­
ceptions to a general rule of imaginative exploitation. Without 
looking too closely, one assumes, with Janet Larson, that Little Dorrit 
at best adopts an ambivalent attitude toward the relation between art 
and life, and that the novel indeed "exposes a deeper pessimism about, 
what artists might accomplish in a culture fundamentally hostile to 
imagination and truth. Dickens's early description of the river 
near Twickenham, however, suggests otherwise: "between the real
landscape and its shadow in the water, there was no division; both 
were so untroubled and clear, and, while so fraught with the solemn 
mystery of life and death, so hopefully reassuring to the gazer's 
soothed heart, because so tenderly and mercifully beautiful" (p. 382). 
The passage offers far more than a conventiorsHand slightly sentimental) 
pastoral scene; it also proposes an alternative vision of the relation 
between life and art —  a vision which insists upon their reciprocity 
and at the same time corrects the equally moral and imaginative 
distortions reflected in Society, in Henry Gowan, in the Circumlocution 
Office, and even in the misguided mental propensities of Clennam,
Flora Finching, and Mrs. Clennam.
Ill
"But in public who shall express the unseen ade­
quately? It is private life that holds out the 
mirror to infinity; personal intercourse, and 
that alone, that ever hints at a personality 
beyond our daily vision."
— E. M. Forster, Howard's End
The scholars who attempt to salvage the notion that Little Dorrit
in some way affirms, or at least,exculpates, the artistic enterprise
turn inevitably to Amy Dorrit and Daniel Doyce as artist figures,
arguing that, in their modest ways, both characters typify art in bono.
Indeed, one cannot deny that Doyce and Amy together seem to realize
some sort of imaginative ideal. Nevertheless, because critics have
failed to recognize fictionalization as the way the Dickensian self
makes sense of reality, they have had to translate Amy's artistry, and
that in which Doyce engages, into nc£.artistic terms. In other words,
Amy Dorrit's life of service, or her capacity for love, or her
gestures of tolerance and forgiveness —  not unlike Doyce1s modest
perseverance —  presumably establish her as the true artist in the
novel, but they do so only metaphorically, with the result that
neither Little Dorrit nor Doyce may be seen as more than a surrogate
artist; neither is quite the real thing. Edwin Barrett, for example,
considers Amy's "selfless devotion" the "highest function of the
32fancy, the moral and social imagination operating as love"; Showalter
grants that in Doyce Dickens "seems to be trying to reconcile the
visionary poet with an older conception of the artist as skilled 
33craftsman" but ultimately his work, like Arthur Clennam*s "morbid 
melancholy" can claim little more than an analogical relationship 
to the artistic sensibility.
But Dickens is not Henry Gowan, and his main concern lies less 
certainly with art as a product or outcome, or indeed with art as 
"making" in any concrete, rigorously physical sense of the word, than 
with art as an internal process of apprehension, In the end, the 
role and responsibility of the artist in Little Dorrit is only 
secondarily to make; Dickens identifies art primarily with seeing.
Such an observation may displease the reader who, accustomed to accept 
the stereotypical notion of the ideal Victorian artist as earnest 
craftsman, remains perfectly willing to regard the eternally diligent 
Doyce and the eternally vigilant Amy Dorrit as diluted but faithful 
versions of that ideal. It may also appear to be inconsistent with 
the Dickensian tendency to discriminate "good" characters from "bad" 
ones according to the amount of work they do. It is not, however, 
that the artist is not also a maker, but rather that in order to make, 
he first must see, and it is this facet of art Dickens examines in 
Little Dorrit. At last, the novel illustrates the conception of the 
true artist Browning propounds..in Sordello; "the best/impart the 
gift of seeing to the rest" (III, 364-65). Such imparting requires 
first not merely sight but insight.
Amy, in short, is an artist; what makes her a finer artist than 
virtually everyone around her (Doyce being the possible exception) is 
nothing more than her perspicacity, her ability to apprehend the 
form not only of the morally good but ultimately of the morally real. 
Such an apprehension is an imaginative act because it involves more 
than a simple conversion of experience into an alternative version 
of itself, requiring further the seeing of what cannot be seen, the 
perceiving of what is not immediately perceptible. The artist in 
Little Dorrit exists foAost to make the invisible visible —  to 
translate it into a recognizable form or, in other words, to represent 
what cannot be presented. In Browning's phrase, he exists to "impart 
the gift of seeing to the rest" and in Forster's phrase to "hold out 
the mirror to infinity." Recent criticism has overlooked entirely one 
of the novel's central motifs —  that of vision —  yet it is only by
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understanding the intimate relation between literal, moral, and 
aesthetic vision that one can begin to understand what Dickens truly 
means by "art," why he insists upon fiction as a primary act of mind, 
and how fiction can serve as a source of social cohesion, and ultimately 
of moral redemption.
A return simply to the techniques of representation dramatized in 
Little Dorrit discovers a definite pattern in the methods whereby 
characters unconsciously convert experience into a version of itself. 
"Good" characters like Doyce, Clennam, Mr. Meagles, and most con­
spicuously Amy Dorrit construct not so much models of what they see 
as representations of what cannot be seen, simulacra which simulate 
what otherwise would remain altogether inaccessible. Again, the world 
of Little Dorrit is an ambiguous one whose mysteries remain largely 
unsolved and whose connections turn out to be illusory. Although this 
self-contradictory, vacillating world obtrudes relentlessly upon the 
senses, it can be known in its entirety only inferentialLy, through 
a kind of imaginative induction or extrapolation from the material 
particulars it comprises. Thus it becomes more than possible to be 
right in the "facts" and, like Affery and "greater people," wrong _ 
in the theories deduced from them. In the present sense, Carlisle 
correctly deduces that Amy, for example, must "pretend a little" if 
she wishes to aknowledge the nature of visible things, for these can 
be mirrored only in grotesque, deceptive images.
Nevertheless, that is only half the question, for Dickens preserves 
the possibility of deducing "theories" from something other than the 
surfaces on display throughout Little Dorrit. The novel suggests also 
the necessarily imaginative "imitation of] the goodness of a better
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order of beings" (p. 53). Such an imitation requires foremost an
extension of the boundaries of the imagination, and, just so, a
widening of perspective and a diversification of point of view.
Imagination, like love in a Shakespearean comedy, looks not with
the eyes but with the mind, and on one level Little Dorrit moves
away from the outward and visible to the inner and spiritual,
replacing the all too concrete particulars of its plot with abstract
realities comprehensible (and communicable) only when the eye
pierces imaginatively the material world.
Far from the last to observe that "the imagination in Little
Dorrit is marked not so much by its powers of particularization as
34by its powers of generalization,"^  Lionel Trilling came close to 
realizing that the only truly moral endeavor in the novel is that 
of rendering the general particular and the particular general, of 
translating the invisible into a visible frame of reference. In 
his introduction to Bleak House J. Hillis Miller remarks that "as a 
blueprint is an image in another form of the building for which it
is a plan, so Bleak House transfers England into another realm, the
35realm of the fictional imagination."-^ While Miller concludes that 
such a blueprint exists to investigate the (social) reality it depicts, 
the same activity, directed to different ends, thrives in Little Dorrit, 
as much through the efforts of individual characters as through those 
of Dickens himself. Beyond the fog and indeterminacy of its plot, 
the novel takes on the shape of a moral blueprint, and the representations 
the true artists in the book make to themselves and to others 
emerge as moral paradigms designed to show not the shadows of 
tangible experience, but rather the underlying moral reality
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ascertainable only after an imaginative penetration of the great 
curtain of empirical "fact."
One of the most striking affinities between Clennam and Amy 
Dorrit resides in the disparity between the material circumstances 
that have always surrounded them and the alternative moral framework 
each constructs and realizes by investing faith in it:*. Both 
Clennam and Amy come of age in settings as horrifying morally as they 
are aesthetically, but both are forced to use those settings as 
templates for the moral worlds they create and occupy. Consequently, 
the ethical codes they develop bear telling structural similarities 
to those around them: what Amy and Clennam do is to convert those
codes into versions of themselves by seeing something present but 
not explicit in them. As the New Testament may be interpreted as a 
fulfillment of the Old which adopts many of its central tenets and 
yet represents a reality that transcends them, so Arthur and Amy at 
once represent and convert the experiential givens that surround them.
"As Mr. F. himself said if seeing is believing not seeing is believing 
too" (p. 589).
The resemblance between the nightmarish world of Arthur Clennam1 s 
childhood and the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Clennam*s own 
upbringing is telling. "'You do not know what it is,'" Mrs. Clennam 
informs Blandois, "'to be brought up strictly and straitly. I was so 
brought up. Mine was no youth of sinful gaiety and pleasure. Mine 
were days of wholesome repression, punishment, and fear. The corruption 
of our hearts, the evil of our ways, the curse that is upon us, the 
terrors that surround us —  these were the themes of my childhood'"
(p. 843). Virtually the same "fiery environment" also forms her stepson's
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character —  in exactly the opposite shape. Clennam1s "nature had 
been disappointed from the dawn of its perceptions" (p. 72); he 
recalls his past as a "legion of Sundays, all days of unserviceable 
bitterness and mortification" (p. 69), all presenting to him an 
apparent reality that perfectly corroborates Mrs. Clennam1 s creed.
At the same time, however, "the fierce dark teaching of his childhood 
had never sunk into his heart" (p. 368), and the moral universe 
Clennam inhabits seems to owe nothing whatever to experience; indeed, 
with respect to perceptible circumstance it is patently unreal, a 
seeming conversion pf actuality into its fictive opposite suspiciously 
like William Dorritfs genteel fictions, or those of Society.
On closer examination, certain likenesses furthermore emerge 
between the inferno of Clennam's existence and the moral blueprint he 
makes to represent it. Clennam describes his parents1 religion as 
"*a gloomy sacrifice of tastes and sympathies that were never their 
own, offered up as part of a bargain for the security of their 
possessions1" (p. 59); the world according to Mrs. Clennam observes 
a system of checks and balances. In Arthur Clennam1s imaginative 
version of that world, retribution becomes its double, restitution: 
"duty on earth, restitution on earth, action on earth" (p. 368), and 
the repayment (rather than the forgiveness) of debt all inform 
Clennam1s imaginative architectonic. Less than evident is the 
dissimilarity between Clennam1s consciousness of the necessity of 
repaying debt and Mrs. Clennam1s notion that she has been "appointed" 
to enforce the vengeful justice of her God. Here, Arthur's and Mrs. 
Clennamfs disparate responses to the "D.N.F." engraved on the 
watchcase again prove instructive, for whereas Mrs. Clennam's reading
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is narrow and reductive, informed by her ultimately unimaginative 
perception of the world around her, Clennam —  able to conceive "of 
all the gentle and good things his life had been without" (p. 206) —  
also is capable of reading openly and imaginatively, and of constructing 
out of the scattered, ambiguous, visible elements of experience (e.g., 
"D.N.F.") the reality (here the fact of mutual human debt) latent 
within them.
An even more profound discernment characterizes Amy's ultimately 
imaginative orientation to reality. Dickens provides the Child of 
the Marshalsea a visible template seemingly antithetical to the moral 
system she copies from it:
With no earthly friend to help her, or so much 
as see her, but the one so strangely assorted; 
with no knowledge even of the common daily tone 
and habits of the common members of the free 
community who are not shut up in prisons; born 
and bred in a social condition, false even with 
reference to the falsest condition outside the 
walls; drinking from infancy of-a well whose 
waters had their own peculiar taste . . . the 
Child of the Marshalsea began her womanly 
life (p. 111).
Yet the "baby whose first draught of air had been tinctured with
Doctor Haggage's brandy" almost immediately sees beyond the spurious
and degenerate world that surrounds her, "perceiv^ing] that it was
not the habit of all the world to live locked up in narrow yards" (p. 108).
Like Clennam, Amy seems merely to convert experience into something
other than what it is, formulating an ethos —  and an aesthetic —
based on standards of delicacy and decency seemingly absent from the
Marshalsea except in a form essentially debased. A closer look at
what Amy in fact perceives, however, reveals that it is precisely because
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the prison defines her frame of reference that she is able to see 
beyond it; hers emerges as at once the least limited and the most 
circumscribed sensibility in the novel. In Book One as well as in 
Book Two Amy regards the world through real and, when those are not 
available, through fictive prison bars, and her conception of mutual 
and unpayable human indebtedness likewise remains constant regardless 
of whether or not she finds herself in the tangible prison that 
objectifies that fact.
In simplest terms, the acquisition of moral knowledge is in 
Little Dorrit an imaginative act, for it is only through imagination 
that surfaces may be penetrated and consequently understood in terms 
of the reality that subsumes them. The first condition of goodness 
for George Eliot was to love; for Dickens the first condition of 
goodness is to imagine. Eventually, of course, imagination and love 
becomes indistinguishable: Fanny, for instance, finds Amy's "subject"
to be love (p. 649), and chafes at "the Art of it —  that she was 
always being placed [by Amy] in the position of being forgiven, whether 
she liked it or not" (p. 646). Love for Fanny is also a fiction, but 
it is a fiction of a very different order, for to think of devotion at 
all is, for the elder of the two Dorrit sisters, to "think lightly and 
eloquently about degenerate impossibilities" (p. 649)•
Half trope and half theme, "vision" in Little Dorrit unites both 
moral and imaginative perception. Whereas Society's metaphorical 
myopia, and William Dorrit*s figurative blindness, underscore their 
spiritual and aesthetic obtuseness —  their inability or refusal to 
discriminate between ugliness and beauty either in a physical or in a 
metaphysical sense —  Amy, Daniel Doyce, and at last Arthur Clennam
see clearly. The “vision” metaphor acquires most significance in the 
context of the relation between the ego and what Dickens seems to define 
as the art of seeing. Here at last unambiguous distinctions emerge 
between “good” and “bad” imaginative perceptions. Society concentrates 
on being seen 7 Amy on becoming invisible. Society makes a concerted 
effort not to see; Amy and Doyce strive only to see, and, in seeing, to 
make others see. For Society moral and imaginative perception —  
vision —  are egocentric and self-promoting acts designed to acquire and 
to possess; for the true artists in the. novel, seeing itself is sym­
pathetic and self-effacing. The social implications are painfully 
obvious, for the imaginative conversions and representations indispensable 
to the comprehension of experience become potentially either 
charitable or cupidit:ou&.. The spiritual implications are similarly 
apparent, for the same acts of fictionalization become potentially 
either fideistic or perfidious.
With unconsious irony Henry Gowan confesses to a possible ”*defect 
in my mental vision*“ (p. 561)* Indeed, Gowan exemplifies the moral 
myopia that occludes artistic vision and prevents the prospective 
artist from imbuing what he represents with the moral beauty that 
would endow it with reality. Gowan is scarcely alone in his short­
sightedness. Merdle “looked out of nine windows in succession and 
appeared to see nine wastes of space” (p. 449); Blandois*s eyes “had 
no depth or change; they glittered, and they opened and shut. So far, 
and waiving their use to himself, a clockmaker could have made a better 
pair” (p. 41). Fanny “in her mind*s eye” can see only “the fair 
bosom that beat in unison with the exaltation of her thoughts,
competing with the bosom that had been famous so long, outshining it, 
and deposing it" (p. 672). Like Mrs. Merdle, always to be found "with 
a glass at her eye," and like Edmund Sparkler, perpetually "with a glass 
at his eye," and like Barnacle Junior, who "had a superior eye-glass 
dangling round his neck, but unfortunately had such flat orbits to 
his eyes, and such limp little eyelids that it wouldnft stick in when 
he put it up" (p. 149), William Dorrit provides "an illustration of 
the axiom that there are no such stone-blind men as those who will 
not see" (p. 326). Indeed, Little Dorrit begins with an image of 
seeing that is not seeing —  with "fixedly staring and glaring" 
Marseilles, where, although nothing escapes surveillance, neither is 
anything definitely seen. Appearance, as one chapter title suggests, 
continually moves toward disappearance, reflecting the impossibility 
of acute direct perception and the necessity of its indirect, and 
imaginative, counterpart.
One has only to think of Mrs. General*s standard comment upon the 
Italian vagrants ("‘They should not be looked at. Nothing unpleasant 
should ever be looked at*" £p. 530]) to grasp the extent to which 
Society cultivates the great art how not to see it. At first glance, 
the pretense seems internally inconsistent, for at the same time 
that Society*s main imaginative impulse directs itself toward not 
seeing anything even remotely suggestive of a moral reality, the 
Merdle coterie also desires to be seen, and continually insinuates 
itself into its own foreground. Whereas for Amy to be is to perceive, 
for Society (which claims as its high priestess the "observed of all 
observers," Mrs. Merdle) to be is to be perceived. Indeed, Society*s 
identity is inextricably bound up with its visibility; from its point
48.
of view, the invisible simply does not exist.
Because Society makes up the "I$ye of the Great World" (p. 655) 
whose cynosure it covets, all its perceptions are ultimately self­
perceptions, and all of its imaginative acts involve nothing more than 
the singularly unimaginative translation of the world into its own 
mirror image. As the object, rather than the subject, of its own 
scrutiny, Society imist necessarily fail in artistic terms, for willing 
to perceive nothing other than itself, and so to create nothing 
other than what it sees (i.e., itself), Society can believe in nothing 
other than itself —  which is to say that it perforce believes in 
nothing. Such a moral and aesthetic condition links Society explicitly 
with Henry Gowan, who likewise neither perceives nor believes in 
anything other than himself, and identifies its failures of imagination 
with Gowan!s artistic shortcomings.
Dickens1s main concern remains that of figuring forth the unseen, 
and he does so in part by showing invisibility to be a 'function more 
of subject than of object. The world seems evanescent and finally 
even non-existent because characters refuse to see it in its true 
form, or because they force it to confom to false or limited frames 
of reference which are themselves nothing more than aspects of the 
visible world to which they are applied. Upon Ms liberation from 
the Marshalsea, for example, William Dorrit "now saw everything 
through their wealth" (p. 670); Fanny Dorrit can only watch her 
father-in-law through "waters of vexation" that "had the effect of 
making the famous Mr. Merdle, in going down the street, appear to 
leap, and waltz, and gyrate" (p. 767)* Mrs. Clennam finds "the world
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. . . narrowed to these dimensions1 (p. 231); and Mrs. General strains 
all of Italy through her own spurious sieve, "taking all of the colour 
out of everything, as Nature and Art had taken it out of herself; 
writing Prunes and Prisms in Mr. Eustacefs text, wherever she could 
lay a hand; looking everywhere for Mr. Eustace and company, and seeing 
nothing else; scratching up the driest little bones of antiquity and 
bolting them without any human visitings" (p. 671).
Mrs. General’s response to the Roman ruins epitomizes Social 
perception, which shows itself to be a sterile transformation of 
circumstance into a narrow and artificial model of it. Though fictive, 
such a mode of orientation to experience is also patently unimaginative, 
not only because of its narrowness, but also because of its refusal 
to take into account the human element ("visitings"). The way Airy 
Dorrit comprehends the same scene reveals a diametrically opposite 
mode of perception. Like Mrs. General, Airy makes sense of the "ruins 
of the vast old Ampitheatre, of the old Temples, of the old 
commemorative Arches, of the old trodden highways, of the old tombs" 
by seeing them imaginatively, that is, by placing them in an invisible 
context. But whereas Mrs. General’s epistemic technique is to 
establish and maintain an aesthetic distance between herself and 
what she sees, and to diminish what she sees by divorcing it from the 
world of feeling, Amy locates what she sees within a wider moral 
scheme that is intrinsically human —  and at the same time subordinates 
herself to the object of perception. The ruins, "besides being what 
they were, to her were ruins of the old Marshalsea —  ruins of her own 
old life —  ruins of the faces and forms that of old peopled it —  
ruins of its loves, hopes, cares, and joys" (p. 671). Viewing ancient
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Rome in terms of an expanded and intensely human frame of reference 
allows Amy to see it as it truly is, as one of "two ruined spheres of 
action and suffering" (p. 671) which unite present and past and 
bestow on them an identity attainable only in the context of human 
action. Although Fanny dismisses..her as "Miss Bat" and "little mole, 
. . .  the blindest of the. blind" (p. 645), Amy clearly is capable 
of the deepest, most complex and penetrating vision in the novel.
The same stereoptic quality characterizes her response to Italy 
in general. Amy’s emerges as a kind of converging double vision 
which encompasses the depth, breadth and height of human experience, 
as well as the affective texture that, once apprehended, bestows upon 
life the reality and visibility it otherwise lacks. Necessarily 
imaginative, the primary act of mind is more imaginative in Little 
Dorrit than in any other character in the novel. Thus Amy spends 
most of her unhappy Italian sojourn simply watching: "she would
musingly watch [the river] running as if, in the general vision, it 
might run dry, and show her the prison, and herself" (p. 520). Cor­
respondingly, what she sees inevitably dwarfs Amy’s already "little 
figure." Standing on the hotel balcony, "Little Dorrit was little 
indeed" (p. 520), and threatens at any moment to vanish altogether.
At the same time, however, Amy is no smaller or less significant than 
she appears to be at the beginning of the nobel, when she "comers] 
out like a little ghost, and vanishes] away without a sound" (p. 127).
Although Affery regards her as "nothing, . . .  a whim of [Mrs. 
Clennam’s]" (p. 80), Little Dorrit*s evasiveness differs dramatically 
from that of Mr. Merdle, who similarly shrinks and subsides whenever
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he finds "himself observed or listened to." Merdle seems always about 
to disappear because he is himself nothing; Amy precisely because she 
is something. Merdle*s role with respect to the world around him, 
like that of Midas with respect to the world around him, is essentially 
to reify it; Amy’s role is to realize everything she touches. The 
true nature of Amy*s invisibility discloses itself near the end of 
the novel, when Clennara recognizes her as the "vanishing-point" in 
"his own poor story":
Everything in its perspective led to her 
innocent figure. He had travelled thousands 
of miles towards it; previous unquiet hopes 
and doubts had worked themselves out before
it; it was the centre of interest in his life;
it was the termination of everything that was 
good and pleasant in it; beyond, there was 
nothing but mere waste and darkened sky (p. 802).
In many ways, Little Dorrit itself focuses on the vanishing-point 
passage, and Richard Stang does not mistakenly find Amy the vanishing 
point "in the same sense Cordelia would be considered the vanishing
point in the design that is King Lear." Stang continues: "Here
Dickens uses the language of realistic perspective painting as prac­
ticed since Piero della Francesca, painting that aimed to give the 
illusion of real space rather than the sort of highly stylized and
grotesque vision of the preceding passage describing the English 
36tourists." The correspondence between the vanishing point in 
Renaissance art and its Dickensian counterpart might usefully be 
pursued. Da Vinci’s "perspective of disappearance" required the 
artist to identify, with mirrors, the point at which all background 
faded into nothingness; transferring such a point to his own canvas,
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the artist could enhance the reality of what he depicted. Just as 
Dickens makes Amy Dorrit the vanishing point in his canvas, so Amy 
comes to occupy the same position in the canvas of Arthur Clennam*s 
perceptions. As the "vanishing-point" Amy —  precisely because of 
her ability to melt into the background —  makes the unseen seen, 
eventually endowing the invisible with identity, dimension, and, 
ultimately, reality.
The vanishing-point passage derives significance from areas other 
than those which establish the nature of Amy!s relation to her 
surroundings, for it also announces Clennam's ascension to the mode 
of artistic perception Little Dorrit both practices and personifies.
In Clennam Dickens dramatizes the education of the imagination.
Throughout the narrative, the imaginative conversions Clennam makes 
serve only partially as foils for the techniques of fictionalization 
whereby other characters in -the novel either destructively or 
self-destructively orient themselves to reality. Although Clennam*s 
fancy often works in bono, many of the ways in which he confronts 
experience resemble nothing so strongly as those with which Mrs.
Clennam and Society alter the external world. It is only during his 
imprisonment that Clennam learns definitely not only Showalter' s 
"right kind of remembering" but equally, if not more, important, the 
right kind of imagining which allows him at last to attain the moral 
and artistic status only Aiijy Dorrit and Daniel Doyce claim con­
sistently.
In the present sense, Larson mistakenly supposes that Doyce "finally 
reflects Dickens’s skepticism toward the Romantic artist" because he
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has no apprentices.^ To draw such a conclusion is not just to read 
much too allegorically the relation between Doyce as inventor and 
Doyce as artist (Doycean invention is art) but further to overlook 
Clennam*s own role as Doyce*s apprentice. Quite simply, Clennam 
learns the mode of vision which allows Dickens to describe Doyce 
thus:
He had the power, often to be found in union 
with such a character, of explaining what he 
himself perceived, and meant, with the direct 
force and distinctness with which it struck 
his own mind. . . . There was something almost 
ludicrous in the complete irreconcilability of 
a vague, conventional notion that he must be 
a visionary man with the precise, sagacious 
travelling of his eye -and thumb over the plans.
. . . His dismissal of himself from his 
description was hardly less remarkable. He 
never said, I discovered this adaptation or 
invented that combination; but showed the 
whole thing as if the Divine artificer had 
made it and he had happened to find it (p. 570).
Throughout his characterization of Doyce, Dickens stresses that 
the inventor is not only a Maker-see but that he is a Maker-see 
because he is primarily a seer —  a ’’visionary man” whose representations 
of reality depend first upon an imaginative perception of that 
reality and second upon an investment of faith in it. Doyce*s 
emerges as exactly the same sort of acuity which allows Amy Dorrit to 
see ”in C^lennam]] what no one else could see” (p. ^32). That acuity 
consists in an ability to grasp the nature of what cannot be seen 
but only represented, and indeed which can be known directly only 
through faith —  ’’the evidence,” as St. Paul had it, ”of things not 
seen.” Thus Doyce regards the work of the "Divine artificer” with 
”a pleasant tounch of respect, . . . mingled with [a^ J quiet admiration
5^ .
of it . . .so calmly convinced he was that it was established on ir­
refragable laws” (p. 570). Amy likewise allows her faith, for example 
in her father* s former self, to contradict what seems to be true of him, 
saying to herself "in a burst of sorrow and compassion *No, no, I have 
never seen him in my life!1" (p. 276).
By contrast, an absence of faith appears to cripple Clennam*s mode 
of imaginative apprehension from the beginning. Fancy provides him a 
means of escape from experience, and Clennam consciously resists the 
possibility that fancy may also be used to comprehend experience. His 
relation to Flora Finching reflects his infidelity to his own 
imaginative perceptions, "for while all that was hard and stem in his 
recollection, remained Reality on being proved —  was obdurate to the 
sight and touch, and relaxed nothing of its old indomitable grimness —  
the one tender recollection of his experience would not bear the same 
test, and melted away" (p. 206). Clennam*s subsequent fictions 
likewise falsify rather than verify the morally real, because implicitly 
they verify only what is visible, and because they quite literally 
presuppose an investment of faith in nothing. The Nobody fictions 
provide a perfect case in point, and resemble far more the mental 
machinations which allow Society to convert what it perceives into 
emptiness and anonymity than, for example, Little Dorrit*s imaginative 
transpositions of Italy and the Marshalsea, or Daniel Doyce*s talent 
for rendering the invisible visible.
Yet Clennam*s initial failure consciously to invest moral confidence 
in what he grasps imaginatively should not be confused with a simple 
lack of faith, for it is less the case that Clennam lacks faith itself 
than that he lacks either the wiH or the ability to acknowledge the
convictions he does possess: "He was a dreamer in such wise, because
he was a man who had, deep-rooted in his nature, a belief in all the 
gentle and good things his life had been without" (p. 206). Aray*s 
love for Clennam emerges as synecdoche for the invisible moral reality 
that can only be grasped imaginatively; throughout most of the novel, 
Clennam*s attempts to invest his faith in the shabbier fabric of 
experience the world seems to offer him (objectified in the misbegotten 
Merdle investments) preclude the creativity and intelligence of 
vision that would allow him to perceive and acknowledge that reality.
Thus "he heard the thrill in £Amy*s] voice, he saw her earnest face, he 
saw her clear true eyes . . . and the remotest suspicion of the truth 
never dawned upon his mind. No. He saw the devoted little creature 
with her worn shoes, in her common dress, in her jail-home; . . . and 
the light of her domestic story made all else dark to him" (p. ^33) •
During his long imprisonment and illness, Clennam ceases gradually 
to evade experience by translating it into the fanciful constructions 
which underscored his affinity with William Dorrit. Instead, he learns 
to substitute for the immediate reality of the prison the underlying 
moral reality which encompasses and qualifies it, and which can only be 
known while he is "dozing and dreaming without power of reckoning time." 
The fusion of dream and fact that informs Little Dorrit*s return reflects 
the extent to which imaginative constructs have become for Clennam not 
just a means of tolerating the burdensome bell he hears at the beginning 
of the novel, or the painful fact that Pet Meagles is not in love with 
him, but, above all, modes of apprehending comprehensively and accurately 
a moral actuality that can be known in no other way. Little Dorrit 
appears to step cut of Clennam*s own fantasy: "the door of his room
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seemed to open to a light touch, and . . .  a quiet figure seemed to 
stand there, with a black mantle on it. It seemed to draw the mantle 
off and drop it on the ground, and then seemed to be his Little Dorrit 
in her old, worn dress. It seemed to tremble and to clasp its hands, 
and to smile, and to burst into tears" (pp. 82^-25). But at the same 
time Clennam also recognizes Amy to be "a living presence," and no longer 
simply the "heroine" of a "domestic story." The virtually invisible 
Little Dorrit becomes visible in her true form only after "the Pupil of 
the Marshalsea" has cultivated his own mental .vision, suspended dis­
belief, and learned to extend the frontiers of his own imagination.
Amy, in other words, is not the only necessary angel to descend at the 
end of Little Dorrit.
In addition to the imaginative faith almost entirely absent from 
his earlier attempts to orient himself to reality, Clennam learns what 
might be called imaginative charity. Throughout Little Dorrit Clennam- 
esque fancy defines itself in terms of its inwardness; almost to the last, 
Clennam shares his extraordinarily private fictions with no one. 
Consequently, they intensify the chronic melancholy that imprisons-,and 
threatens to destroy him. Like the Nobody fictions, the Flora Finching 
fictions of his youth demonstrate Clennam1s imaginative isolation in 
middle age:
In his youth he had ardently loved this woman, 
and had heaped upon her all the locked-up 
wealth of his affection and imagination. That 
wealth had been, in his desert home, like 
Robinson Crusoe's money; exchangeable with no 
one, lying idle in the dark to rust until he 
poured it out for her. Ever since that memor­
able time he had, until the night of his 
arrival, as completely dismissed her from any 
association with his Present or Future as if
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she had been dead. . . • M e  had kept 
the old fancy of the Past unchanged, in 
its old sacred place (p. 191)*v*
This doomed hoarding of fictions parallels those of Chivery, with 
his secret epitaphs, and Affery, with her uncommunicated 1 dreams,1 and 
it counterpoints the outwardness of Amy’s and Doycefs imaginative 
lives. Doyce1s designs automatically objectify his own recognitions:
• for him to see is, again in Browning’s terms, simultaneously to see 
and to impart the gift of seeing to the rest. Amy reflects even more 
clearly the Pauline willingness to communicate that is indispensable 
to the truly artistic vision. Story, in fact, turns out to be one 
of the few currencies Amy possesses, and she dispenses it freely.
Four examples will illustrate the principle of narrative charity Amy 
embodies —  a principle which sets her apart from Affery, who steadfastly 
keeps her dreams to herself even when to articulate them would be to 
dispel some of the circumstantial murk that permeates the house of 
Clennam.
The scene in which Amy introduces Maggy to Clennam seems minor 
enough until one begins to examine its narrative texture, for in it 
Amy tells Maggy’s ”history,” adopting the "tone of telling a child’s 
story” (p. 1^ 3), and concluding the pathetic tale on a note of utterly 
false cheer: ”’And that,1 said Little Dorrit, clapping the two great
hands together, ’is Maggy’s history as Maggy knows! 111 In the course 
of the stoxy, Amy at once fictionalizes and realizes experience; 
indeed, she can only impart the truth of Maggy’s situation in the guise 
of a fiction, for in this case story emerges as the only conscionable 
mode of communication, and one which preserves Maggy’s dignity at the
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same time that it manages to convey to Clennam the story within the 
story, and the actual horror of Maggy*s past.
Many zealous critics have scrutinized the curious f,Tale of .the 
Princess,n yet the story resists elucidation, suggesting its own cen­
trality to the theme of narrative that runs through Little Dorrit (it 
is after all the only explicit story in the novel) without yielding up 
the exact nature of its relation to the rest of the book. Randolph 
Splitter dismisses the story as "a sentimental fairy tale about ^Little 
Dorrit1s] secret Prince Charming1 for Larson, the telling of the tale 
constitutes an 1 escape into a confessional story . . . both necessary 
and finally unsuccessful in opening a new way of salvation for the 
suffering soul'1 and indicating “only the failure of narrative in the 
face of realities in which princesses know more than fairy tales promise.*"39 
Carlisle finds the stoiy nothing more than Amy Dorrit !s 1 grotesque 
comment on her sense of identity: she becomes a corpse united to a
shadow.11^
In fact, the tale*s psychological value to Little Dorrit (for 
Barbara Hardy the story is “uttered . . . reticently, in release and 
relief" -v remains secondary to its significance to the concept of 
fictionalization Dickens figures forth in the course of the novel.
The tale, like all of Little Dorrit*s narratives, is designed to
reveal the structure of reality —  in this case, the nature of Amy's
\
feeling for Arthur Clennam. It does so through indirection, by 
translating affective facts into images which reflect their true 
identity in a way overt, factual statement could not. Amy*s love for 
Clennam can only be apprehended imaginatively; abstract and invisible,
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it refuses to be known except in a series of fictive reflections of 
itself. If love may be taken as one of the moral realities which can 
only be communicated and comprehended through techniques of fictionali- 
zation, the story's function becomes apparent. As an equally 
imaginative and communicative act, narrative emerges as a truly moral 
mode of discourse: the “Tale of the Princess" illustrates the
mechanisms of indirection whereby fiction confronts reality, absorbs 
it, and at last gives it up again in its true form.
The story is far more successful than Larson supposes in imparting 
to Maggy the truths it illuminates. Maggy herself can only compre­
hend Little Dorrit*s meaning by translating it into her own private 
lexicon, which equates love with "chicking" and "the Hospital." 
Perceiving the absence of love to afflict Little Dorrit*s "tiny 
woman," Maggy proposes that "they ought to have took her to the 
Hospital, . . . and then she*d have got over it" (p. 3^2). More to 
the point, the story mirrors exactly the actual spiritual states of 
the characters it translates into their fictional counterparts.
Arthur Clennam, by this time immersed in the Nobody fictions, jls. a 
shadow, and the story furthermore recognizes the fate both of hoarded 
fictions and of those who hoard them.
Amy's two letters to Clennam most clearly mirror the right use of 
the imagination as a mode of moral knowledge. They emphasize the com­
prehensiveness and empathy of vision possible only through a 
conscientious application of the imagination. The letters themselves 
are stories which reveal only through indirection a number of moral 
realities, the state of Pet's marriage to Gowan and Amy's feeling for 
Clennam chief among them. In the letters Amy adopts a number of points
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of view —  most notably those of Clennam ("I had only been watchful for 
you, and had only noticed what I think I have noticed, because I was 
quickened by your own interest in it" £p. 6o8j) and Pet ("I fancy I 
don't look at it with my own eyes, but with hers" £p. 605~\) —  each 
time surrendering herself to the alternative points of view that, allow 
her to envision and correspondingly to reveal the truth about what 
she sees.
Indeed, Amy's meditations take the steadfastly subjunctive mood 
by which Clennam represents to himself the moral realities he comes 
to believe in at the end of the novel. "I could not keep it out of 
my mind," Amy writes, "that if I was Mrs. Gowan . . . I should feel 
that I was rather lonely and lost, for the want of some one who was 
steadfast and firm in purpose. I even thought she felt this want a 
little, almost without knowing it. But mind you are not made uneasy 
ty this, for she was 'very well and very happy.* And she looked most 
beautiful" (p. 521). The narrative mode, and the imaginative trans­
positions it requires in order to exist, allow Amy to reveal the 
stable pattern underlying the ambiguous texture of fact that has 
presented itself to her. A multiplicity of perspectives, each attained 
through an imaginative projection of self into other, ultimately 
reveals the truth. Amy looks simultaneously through Clennam's eyes, 
through Pet's eyes, through her own "I," and through the eternal frame 
of reference, the prison bars. The act is as sympathetic as it is 
imaginative, as moral as it is fictional.
Mutatis mutandis, Little Dorrit itself deliberately assumes a 
number of perspectives, in striking contrast to the other "dark novels," 
Bleak House and Great Expectations, with their rigorous adherence to
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one or two discrete points of view. Dickens*s monthly number plans for 
Little Dorrit reveal a determination to incorporate into the story as 
many points of view as possible. Devising the "Moving in Society" 
chapter, for example, Dickens decides that everything will be "indistinctly
J k O
seen, as Little Dorrit saw it"; his notes for the "History of a
44Self-Tormentor" read: "From her own point of view. Dissect it" ;
approaching the end of the novel, Dickens resolves to "tell the whole 
story, working it out as much as possible through M1*3, Clennam herself."2*2*' 
Little Dorrit comprises a dizzying number of perspectives, becoming a 
tale told by everybody and by nobody —  exactly as everybody and yet 
nobody sees the events it describes. At the same time, the novel 
acknowledges the dependence of all moral determinations upon point of 
view, suggesting that the angle of perception (like the angle of in­
cidence) inevitably determines the meaning of what is seen (the angle 
of reflection).
Dickens begins one of the critical chapters in Book One, "Little 
Dorrit*s Party," by remarking that "this history must sometimes see 
with Little Dorrit*s eyes, and shall begin that course t?y seeing [[Arthur 
Clennam]]" (p. 208). The subsequent narrative, which includes the 
imaginative conversion of the stars into dancers at a party, emphasizes 
the contingency of meaning upon the orientation of the observer and, 
more important, upon the comprehensiveness of’his point of view. Reality 
becomes an inevitably subjective phenomenon whose subjectivity can be 
vanquished only when it calls attention to itself and in calling attention 
to itself ironically extends itself. Thus Little Dorrit*s view of 
Clennam*s "‘dim room" is informed not only by the "courtly ideas, . . . 
costly ideas, . . . picturesque ideas" noted above, but also by "desolate
ideas, . . . teeming ideas" which "made the room dimmer than it was 
in Little Dorrit*s eyes as they timidly saw it from the door" (p. 208). 
The comprehensiveness of Amy Dorrit*s vision, in short, transcends 
its own subjectivity.
Nevertheless, Little Dorrit continues to stress the apparent 
relativity of meaning. At the convent of the Saint Bernard, William 
Dorrit insists "that the apace was so —  ha —  hum —  so very con­
tracted. More than that, it was always the same, always the same1.' (p. 
493) • The host, on the contrary, suffers no sense of confinement 
whatever —  "almost all objects had their various points of view, 
Monsieur, and he did not see this poor life of his from the same point 
of view. Monsieur was not used to confinement" (p. 493)* Clearly 
Dorrit and the host occupy opposing imaginative poles, each identified 
by;the .extent to which perspectives are imaginatively widened, or 
imaginatively narrowed, as the case might be. Dorrit!s inability to 
see the convent except in terms of his own history of confinement 
counterpoints the host1 s imaginative flexibility and the comprehensivenes 
of his mental vision: "Monsieur could not easily place himself in the 
position of a person who had not the power to choose, I will go here 
to-morrow, or there next.1 day; I will pass these barriers, I will enlarge 
those bounds. Monsieur could not realize, perhaps, how the mind 
accommodated itself to such things in the force of necessity" (p. 494;).
The irony, of course, is that "Monsieur" has spent the first half 
of the..novel "in the position of a person who had not the power to 
choose"; his failure to recall that "position" underscores his 
imaginative feebleness. Finally, Ferdinand Barnacle's visit to the 
imprisoned and afflicted Arthur Clennam includes a most enlightening
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discourse on moral optics and their relation to the Circumlocution 
Office, whose identity the engaging young Barnacle correctly finds to 
depend on the perspective from which it is studied. 1 'You don't 
regard it from the right point of view,*" Barnacle tells Clennam.
"lit is the point of view that is the essential thing. Regard our 
place from the point of view that we only ask you to leave us alone, 
and we are as capital a Department as you'll find anywhere. . . • Look 
at it from the right point of view and there you have us —  official 
and effectual*" (p. 804).
The "right point of view" Barnacle proposes is of course very much 
the wrong point of view, but his glib assertions to the contrary 
bring to the surface the questions about "right" and "wrong" perspective 
which underlie Little Dorrit from the beginning. There would seem to 
exist no definite standard to determine which perceptions are wrong 
and which right: all perceptions —  all imaginative orientations to
reality —  their inevitability notwithstanding, must be held suspect.
(In terms of modem literary theory, all texts are indeterminate in 
meaning and all interpretations are therefore equally valid.) Clennam*s 
ultimate response to Little Dorrit would seem to reinforce such a 
notion, for it too appears to confirm moral and aesthetic relativity: 
"The same deep timid earnestness that he had always seen in her, and 
never without emotion, he saw still. If it had any new meaning that 
smote him to the heart, the change was in his perception, not in 
her" (p. 826). A closer examination of the passage, however, especially 
in the context of the ideas of comprehensiveness of vision and 
imaginative extension Dickens develops in the course of the novel, 
discovers not what Larson calls "the puzzlement of the artist tlying
64.
to speak f:the plain truth* in a world of 'twilight judgments, mists 
and obscurities* where fiction seems inevitable and inevitably morally 
ambiguous," but rather an affirmation of truly artistic vision, and ef 
the "right perception" it brings with it.
Although insistent upon a multiplicity of points of view, Dickens 
never truly denies the possibility of right perspective, often con­
firming that possibility in negative terms which illustrate the wrong-
46ness of certain points of view. All such moral and aesthetic 
vantage points nevertheless share at least two common features: they
are egocentric and they are correspondingly limited and self-imprisoning. 
Mrs. Clennam*s perspective, for example, amounts to an absence of 
perspective, an imaginative confinement reflected in a moral and 
aesthetic universe so "narrowed" that its sole occupant loses all 
ability to conceive of the world outside her room. Miss Wade prides 
herself on her observational acuity ("From a very early age I have 
detected what those about me thought they hid from me" [[p. 725])* 
but her "history" demonstrates nothing so clearly as the narrowness, 
rigidity, and perverse narcissism that control her imaginative life.
Because Little Dorrit itself, like Amy Dorrit's fictions, incor­
porates numerous points of view, Miss Wade's "history" betrays its 
own limitations and ultimately its own utter inaccuracy as a mirror 
of reality, i.e., as an account of her past and an explanation of her 
present. One sees at once, for instance, that what Miss Wade interprets 
as "fair words and fair pretences" to be "penetrated below" (p. 728) 
are actually gestures of kindness. Yet little in the "History of a 
Self-Tormentor" itself (its title aside) distinguishes it from the 
work of a legitimately enraged imagination like that of Jane EJyre.
What exposes the illegitimacy of the "history" is in part the narrative
technique of the novel in which it appears, which has already
approached Miss Wade from a number of directions. The novel asks of
its reader a comprehensiveness of vision which will permit him to
reject Miss Wade's perceptions as false and limited. Indeed, Dickens
went to great pains to weave the "history" into Little Dorrit, expressing
to his biographer John Forster the intention of "mak[ing] the blook
47of the book circulate through both." ' Precisely because the blood of 
the book circulates through both the main and the interpolated story,
Miss Wade's narrative lends itself to a study of perspective in Little 
Dorrit: by presenting several points of view and demanding not that
the reader choose among them, but rather that he take all of them 
into account, the novel transcends each of the discrete perspectives 
it encompasses and comments upon all of them so delicately and 
indirectly as to reveal unquestionably the psychological, social, and 
moral realities they express synecdochally'.
Ultimately the novel forms its own comprehensive and multifarious 
point of view, which in its comprehensiveness and internal diversity —  
in its imaginativeness —  represents a reality external to itself in 
a way most of the fictions it incorporates and describes could not hope 
to do. It is only by understanding Little Dorrit*s own point of view, 
and the way it achieves that point of view through the sympathetic and 
imaginative adoption of a multiplicity of perspectives, that one can 
begin to accept the possibility that certain perceptions are indeed 
more right than others, and that what makes them so i£ the degree of 
artistic and imaginative integrity with which they have been achieved. 
For to take a number of points of view is necessarily an imaginative
feat, involving ultimately the creative conversion of perceived experience 
into something other than what it appears to be. Thus Dickens can not 
only state but further affirm that "none of us clearly know to whom or 
to what we are indebted in this wise, until some marked stop in the 
whirling wheel of life brings the right perception with it" (p. 78?) •
When Amy Dorrit returns to Clennam he sees her less from an altogether 
novel perspective than from a more complex and inclusive and novelistic 
ones i'The same deep timid earnestness he had always seen in her . . . 
he saw still."
The path from the acts of fictionalization whereby all characters 
in Little Dorrit orient themselves to experience, through the fictions 
which elucidate and communicate the nature of reality, to the 
determination that the frontiers of imagination are tovextended rather 
than denied is a steep and treacherous one indeed. Deliberately 
complex and ambiguous, the novel approaches from a number of perspectives 
a vision of human reality which at last can only be inferred imaginatively 
from the clues the narrative itself provides. Dickens's intention 
would seem to be less announce the nature of reality by making a 
number of moral and social pronouncements upon the subject of mutual 
human indebtedness, or the necessity of love, than to explore and 
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